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This article presents an overview of the EU "Tax Package", comprising the Code of 
Conduct for business taxation, the Directive on taxation of savings income and the 
Directive on taxation of interest and royalty payments. Its main objective is to offer a 
comprehensive view of the negotiation process, and a broad overview of the content 
of the package, as well as pending policy issues. This then allows drawing a number 
of  lessons  concerning  the  approach  followed  and  the  outlook  for  future  European 
initiatives on direct taxation. 
 
An agreement on the Tax Package was obtained in June 2003 following several years 
of intense negotiation between the EU Member States. This outcome was attributable 
to an innovative tax strategy, which involved bundling a number of sensitive issues so 
that every Member State could be an overall winner.  
 
The negotiations on the Tax Package highlighted the global dimension of tax issues. It 
could never have been concluded without the agreement of certain key third countries 
and dependent or associated territories of Member States. The tax debate thereby led 
to discussions on other aspects of the EU’s relations with the countries or territories 
concerned. Were action against harmful practices to be stepped up in the future, the 
EU’s Member States and institutions might consider explicitly linking the abolition of 
harmful tax practices to other issues. 
 
Looking beyond the Tax Package, the EU will have to make a number of strategic 
choices in tax matters. The Community’s field of intervention in matters of harmful 
tax competition could for instance be  expanded to encompass additional forms of 
competition to those covered by the Tax Package.  
 
Decision-making  processes  and  "institutions"  are  also  an  important  issue.  In 
particular, an issue is whether to foster the existence of a loose negotiating structure 
based on a body of high-level working groups or to try and integrate these working 
groups  into  a  more  stable  and  coherent  framework  such  as  a  EU  Tax  Policy 
Committee. 
 
The Tax Package has brought major advances in matters of tax policy at EU level. 
Besides  stimulating  thought  and  discussion  on  tax  competition,  it  has  raised 
awareness among the Member States of the interdependence of their tax policies and 
of the potential benefits of cooperation at EU level. 
 
JEL Classification: H30 
 
Keywords: EU tax policy - EU tax package - savings directive - code of conduct for 
business taxation - Taxation Policy Group   1 
A HISTORY OF THE "TAX PACKAGE" 






“Start out with an ideal and end up with a deal” 





Decision-taking in the taxation area at EU level is notoriously difficult. Taxation is at 
the heart of national sovereignty and one of the most protected "chasses gardées" of 
the EU Member States. Unanimous decisions on tax matters between the latter are 
therefore generally only obtained after long and difficult negotiations.  
 
Therefore, a recurring question arises as to how cooperation between Member States 
can be nurtured when need for such cooperation is identified.  
 
An  interesting  answer  was  found  in  the  last  decade  with  the  development  of  a 
"package approach" in order to solve some of the most pressing EU issues in the 
direct taxation area. Between 1997 and 2004 the Ministers of Economy and Finance 
of  the  EU  Member  States  devoted  considerable  efforts  in  order  to  adopt  the  Tax 
Package,  comprising  the  Code  of  Conduct  for  business  taxation,  the  Directive  on 
taxation  of  savings  income  and  the  Directive  on  taxation  of  interest  and  royalty 
payments. 
 
This article presents an overview of this Tax Package. Its main objective is to offer a 
comprehensive view of the negotiation process, and a broad overview of the content 
of the package, as well as pending policy issues. This then allows drawing a number 
of  lessons  concerning the  approach  followed  and the  outlook  for future  European 
initiatives on direct taxation. 
 
The first section chronicles discussions in the Council and their final outcome. It deals 
with each of the Tax Package’s three components in turn. It describes in detail the 
objective  set  by  the  Council,  the  working  method  followed  and  the  outcome  of 
negotiations.  The  second  section  presents  recent  developments  in  the  three  areas 
included in the Tax Package. It also discusses policy issues and presents some ideas 
of  potential  future  developments  in  these  areas.  The  third  section  offers  a  few 
thoughts on the "package approach" decided in Verona. Beyond the tax package, it 
presents a reflection on EU decision-taking processes and instruments in the tax area. 
                                                 
1  The author is administrator at the European Commission Directorate-General for Budget. This 
paper stems in part from several previous works in collaboration with former colleagues in the 
Commission Directorate-General for Taxation in Customs Union, whom I thank here. I would 
like to acknowledge in particular inputs and comments from M. Mors (sections 1 and 3), V. 
Kalloe and J.-E. Dulière (Code of Conduct), G. Mirabile (Savings Directive), U. Ihli (Interest 
and  royalties).  Remaining  mistakes  are  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  author,  though.  The 
opinions  expressed  in  this  article  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  European 
Commission. Contact: philippe.cattoir@ec.europa.eu.   2 
1.   A history of the “Tax Package” 
 
Before turning to the detailed description of negotiations for each of the components 
of the Tax Package, it is worth setting the scene by briefly recalling some elements of 
context and providing a quick overview of the Verona approach. 
 
Direct taxation is an area in which cooperation at EU level is notoriously difficult. 
Owing to the need for unanimity, it took, for instance, almost 30 years of discussions
2 
to  produce  the  first  European  directives  on  business  taxation,  the  1990 
Parent/Subsidiary and Merger Directives.
3 
 
In response to the growing need for international cooperation on direct taxation and 
the sheer difficulty of meeting that need, notably because such decisions have to be 
unanimous, the Commission
4 prompted a general discussion of taxation in the EU 
when  Ecofin  met  informally  in  Verona  in  April 1996.  This  discussion  brought 
progress on two fronts. First, a high-level working group was set up to address tax 
issues at EU level: it comprised personal representatives of the finance ministers and 
was chaired by the competent member of the Commission.
5 This working group was 
to foster more direct, less bureaucratic and less formal contacts between the finance 
ministers’  personal  representatives  and  to  give  tax  discussions  in  the  EU  a  more 
political dimension. In terms of content, the Verona Council marked the beginning of 
an EU tax strategy  based on a  comprehensive approach, on the simultaneous and 
linked discussion of a number of important issues. 
 
The  work  carried  out  by  the  Commission
6  in  liaison  with  the  high-level  working 
group (which became the Taxation Policy Group in December 1996
7) after the Verona 
Council  culminated  in  the  adoption  of  a  Tax  Package  at  the  Council  meeting  of 
1 December 1997. The package was expressly linked to the Verona discussions and 
explained by “the need for coordinated action at European level to tackle harmful tax 
competition  in  order  to  help  achieve  certain  objectives  such  as  reducing  the 
continuing distortions in the single market, preventing excessive losses of tax revenue 
or  getting  tax  structures  to  develop  in  a  more  employment-friendly  way.”
8  These 
objectives were related in practice, since most Member States were unwilling to put 
their weight behind a measure aimed at reducing tax distortions in the single market 
and to getting tax structures to develop in a more employment-friendly way without 
firm guarantees that their tax revenue would not fall. 
 
                                                 
2   In the wake of the Neumark report proposing the harmonisation of business taxation in the 
Community,  Europäische  Wirtschaftgemeinschaft  –  Kommission:  Bericht  des  Steuer-  und 
Finanzausschusses (Neumark Bericht), Brussels, 1962. 
3   These Directives (90/435/EEC and 90/434/EEC respectively) were the result of proposals that 
had been on the Council table since 1969 (see OJ C 39, 22.3.1969). 
4  Taxation in the EU, European Commission, 1996. 
5  Mario Monti, succeeded in autumn 1999 by Frits Bolkestein. 
6  See Taxation in the EU: report on the development of tax systems, European Commission, 
1996; Towards tax co-ordination in the EU: a package to handle harmful tax competition, 
European Commission, 1 October 1997; A package to tackle harmful tax competition in the 
EU, European Commission, 5 November 1997. 
7  Dublin European Council. 
8  Ecofin meeting of 1 December 1997. Note that there is no precise definition of harmful tax 
competition. There are, however, a number of criteria for identifying harmful measures by 
their supposed impact on the single market, tax revenue and employment.   3 
“In  a  spirit  of  comprehensiveness  of  approach”  –  vital  to  achieving  a  unanimous 
agreement - three areas of direct taxation
9 were highlighted: (i) business taxation, (ii) 
taxation of savings income and (iii) the issue of withholding taxes on cross-border 
interest and royalty payments between companies. A code of conduct was proposed 
for  business  taxation,  and  the  Commission  was  asked  to  submit  proposals  for 
directives in the other two areas and to pursue its work on taxation with the Taxation 
Policy Group. The issues, the arguments and the negotiating methods are explained 
below. 
 
A systematic examination of the discussions relating to the Tax Package reveals the 
incremental  nature  of  the  negotiating  process.  The  discussions  and  diagnosis  that 
culminated in the Verona Council were followed, as of 1 December 1997, by more or 
less  separate  discussions  in  each  of  the  three  areas  of  the  Tax  Package.  Specific 
procedures and negotiating bodies were set up for each area. The treatment of each 
area in isolation showed its limitations at the Helsinki European Council of 10 and 
11 December 1999,  where  savings  brought  everything  to  a  halt.  This  European 
Council was therefore followed by a period of hesitance and uncertainty while all 
political efforts were focused on finding a way out of the deadlock. A solution was 
reached at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000 in the 
form  of  a  political  compromise  on  savings.  This  breathed  new  life  into  the  Tax 
Package,  resulting  in  an  intermediate  agreement  at  the  Ecofin  meeting  of  26  and 
27 November 2000.
10 The content of the Tax Package was basically wrapped up at the 
end of 2000, but the same measures still had to be accepted by a number of dependent 
or associated territories and equivalent measures in non-member countries. Most of 
these negotiations were completed towards the end of 2004. 
 




The Code “concerns those measures which affect, or may affect, in a significant way 
the location of business in the Community”. More specifically, “tax measures which 
provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, 
than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question are to be 
regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered by this Code. Such a level of 
taxation may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any other 
relevant factor.” 
 
The Code also lays down criteria for assessing harmful tax measures: 
 
“When assessing whether such measures are harmful, account should be taken of, 
inter alia: 
i. whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of transactions 
carried out with non-residents, or 
                                                 
9  There  had  initially  been  plans  to  include  indirect  taxation  in  the  package.  In  the  face  of 
opposition from several Member States at the Ecofin meeting on 13 October, the Commission 
dropped indirect taxation from subsequent versions of the package. 
10  Discussions  between  The  European  Council  of  Santa  Maria  da  Feira  and  the  European 
Council  in  Nice  (8/12/2000)  were  conducted  by  the  Code  of  Conduct  Group  (Business 
Taxation) and the Financial Questions Group (savings, interest payments and royalties).   4 
ii. whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they do not affect 
the national tax base, or 
iii.  whether  advantages  are  granted  even  without  any  real  economic  activity  and 
substantial economic presence within the Member State offering such tax advantages, 
or 
iv.  whether  the  rules  for  profit  determination  in  respect  of  activities  within  a 
multinational group of companies departs from internationally accepted principles, 
notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD, or 
v. whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal provisions are 
relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.” 
 
It should be stressed that the assessment of whether tax measures are harmful under 
the Code of Conduct was based on clear criteria (which nevertheless left room for 
interpretation)  and  confined  to  specific  measures  in  Member  States’  tax  systems. 
There was absolutely no question of using the Code as a basis for assessing general 
tax  measures.  The  “harmfulness”  of  measures  was  also  based  on  criteria  which, 
though heading in the same direction, differ slightly from those of other international 





The Code of Conduct provided for the Council to set up a group to assess the tax 
measures that could fall within the scope of the Code. The setting-up of the group was 
confirmed at the Ecofin meeting of 9 March 1998. It was called the “Code of Conduct 
Group” or the “Primarolo Group”, after its chair, Ms Dawn Primarolo, the current 
Paymaster-General of the United Kingdom. At the time of publication of this article, 
the  Code  of  Conduct  Group  continues  to  monitor  the  standstill  and  rollback  of 
harmful tax measures. 
 
It is worth recapitulating the working method used. First and foremost, the fact that 
the  Code  of  Conduct  “is  a  political  commitment  and  does  not  affect  the  Member 
States' rights and obligations or the respective spheres of competence of the Member 
States and the Community resulting from the Treaty” makes clear the Council’s desire 
to keep control of work relating to the Code. The leading role in the negotiations was 
therefore  played  by  the  Code  of  Conduct  Group,  whose  secretariat  is  officially 
provided by the Council’s General Secretariat. The Commission admittedly plays a 
major role via its support to the Group and its participation in the Group’s discussions 
– indeed it has drawn up almost all of the Group’s key working papers – but the 
working  environment  remains  heavily  intergovernmental.  This  is  illustrated 
beautifully by the Code of Conduct’s inclusion in a “Resolution of the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council 
of 1 December 1997 on a code of conduct for business taxation”. 
 
Though the Council takes its decisions unanimously, for instance when called on to 
approve  the  Group’s  proposals,  the  Group  itself  tends  to  reach  decisions  by 
consensus. The Primarolo Report emphasises that “where unanimity was not achieved 
                                                 
11  For a comparison of OECD and EU criteria, see, for example, Tax competition in the EU, 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Economic Affairs Series, ECON-105 
EN Rec (10-2000).   5 
the report reflects the broad consensus and alternative views.”
12 This is in line with 
the Group’s mandate from Ecofin, which requires the Group’s reports to the Council 
to  reflect  either  the  unanimous  opinion  of  its  members  or  the  different  opinions 
expressed in the course of its discussions. This approach may have been necessary for 
calm scrutiny of harmful tax measures, but it was certainly not sufficient to enable the 
Council  to  (unanimously)  agree  on  the  list  of  66 measures,  presented  in  the 
November 1999 report, that “affect to a significant extent the location of business 
activity in the European Community.”
13 Ecofin did not manage to reach unanimous 
agreement on the 66 harmful measures identified by the Primarolo Report until the 
Council meeting of 26 and 27 November 2000. 
 
Lastly, the Code of Conduct Group’s work was, to a certain extent, informed by the 
Commission' s  policy  on  state  aids.  Note  in  this  respect  Ecofin’s  conclusions  of 
1 December 1997,  in  which  "the  Council  notes  that  the  Commission  [...]  commits 
itself to the strict application of the aid rules concerned, taking into account, inter 






Basically, the deadlines for the Code of Conduct’s application were agreed in two 
steps. In November 2000 Ecofin established the key principles for dismantling the 66 
harmful measures cited in the Primarolo Report.
15 Generally speaking, all harmful 
arrangements were to be dismantled by 31 December 2002, as agreed at the Council 
meeting  of  1 December 1997.  However,  for  undertakings  deriving  benefit  from 
harmful arrangements on 31 December 2000, such arrangements were to lapse no 
later than 31 December 2005, whether or not they were granted for a fixed period. 
Undertakings  were  also  “barred  from  entering  into  harmful  arrangements  after 
31 December 2001, except where such arrangements are the subject of an existing 
Commission decision providing for longer duration within the framework of State 
aids, and, in any case, from deriving benefit from them after 31 December 2002”. 
Lastly, the conclusions of November 2000 stated that the Council could nevertheless 
decide “on a case-by-case basis, to take account of special circumstances, on the 
basis of a report by the Code of Conduct Evaluation Group, to continue the effects of 
certain harmful arrangements after 31 December 2005.” 
 
However, the relatively tight deadlines fixed at that time for the standstill and rollback 
of arrangements was out of synch with the slower progress on savings. Some Member 
                                                 
12  The Primarolo Report was submitted by the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) to 
Ecofin on 29 November 1999 (made public after the Ecofin meeting of 28 February 2000). 
13  The Primarolo Report lists 201 measures by Member States and 85 by dependent or associated 
territories that it examined. Many different opinions were expressed by the Member States in 
the course of discussions. These opinions are mentioned in the report. 
14  The Commission has also published guidelines on the application of the rules on state aid to 
measures  relating  to  direct  business  taxation  (see  paragraph  J  of  the  Code  of  Conduct 
(Business  Taxation)).  These  guidelines  were  adopted  by  the  Commission  on 
11 November 1998 (see note 98/C 384/03, OJ No C 384, 10.12.1998, p. 3). See also Report on 
the  implementation  of  the  Commission  notice  on  the  application  of  the  state  aid  rules  to 
measures relating to direct business taxation (C(2004)434 of 9 February 2004). 
15  See  the  Presidency' s  note  (13555/00  FISC  190)  of  20  November  2000  and  Ecofin’s 
conclusions of 26 and 27 November 2000.   6 
States  were  reluctant  to  meet  the  deadlines  laid  down  by  the  Code  when  final 
agreement had yet to be reached on savings. In practice, the standstill on harmful 
measures  was  applied  by  all  Member  States  but  not  by  all  their  dependent  and 
associated territories. This did not, however, prevent the Code of Conduct Group from 
making further headway. On a technical level, the Group produced guidelines and did 
a lot of ground work in a number of problem areas.
16 Further political agreement was 
reached  at  the  Council  meeting  of  3 June 2003,  this  time  taking  account  of  much 
fuller information on the progress achieved in relation to the Directive on savings 
income, especially in respect of dependent or associated territories and of certain non-
member countries. It was decided at that meeting, in line with the possibility afforded 
by  the  November 2000  agreement,  to  extend  “on  a  case-by-case  basis,  ...  to  take 
account  of  special  circumstances”  the  application  of  certain  harmful  measures.
17 
Some might see this decision as circumstantial evidence – there being no absolute 
proof – that the agreement on savings was obtained at the cost of greater flexibility on 
business taxation. The Code of Conduct Group has since pressed on with its work on 
the  standstill  and  rollback  of  harmful  arrangements.  Dozens  of  the  harmful 
arrangements on the Primarolo Report’s list of 66 measures were rolled back in 2003 




It is also worth noting that the commitment to apply the principles of the Code of 
Conduct  figured  among  the  conditions  for  EU  membership  in  the  last  (2004) 
enlargement round. The European Commission screened the candidate countries for 
potentially harmful measures in 2002-2003 and identified 30. They were discussed by 
the Council and included in the accession negotiations. The Commission monitored 
progress and incorporated its findings in the "comprehensive monitoring report on 
preparations  for  membership"  drawn  up  for  each  of  the  candidate  countries.  The 
process proved successful, since the candidate countries had abolished most of the 
harmful arrangements before enlargement.
19 The standstill and rollback of the new 
Member States’ harmful arrangements is now  monitored by the Code  of Conduct 
Group. 
 
Looking at the work done by the Code of Conduct Group it seems fair to say that 
most of the preferential regimes targeted had one or more of the following features: 
offshore activities, holding of shares, mobile activities within Free Zones, rulings with 
a fixed margin and discretionary powers for tax authorities to determine a lower level 
of taxation than the general applicable rule. Relating to multinational groups, many 
regimes provided for a preferential treatment (either through a reduced tax rate or a 
reduced  tax  base)  of  financial  services,  group  financing,  licensing  of  patents  and 
trademarks, (captive) insurance and so on. 
 
                                                 
16  The Group drew up guidelines for standstill and rollback in the finance branch, holdings and 
headquarters areas and for transparency and the exchange of information on transfer pricing. 
17  In practice the Council accepted all 18 demands made by the Member States. 
18  In particular, two arrangements introduced by the Netherlands Antilles are to be rolled back 
on the basis of an agreement reached at the Ecofin meeting of 7 December 2004. 
19  At the time of writing (late 2004), two harmful tax arrangements in one Member State have 
yet to be abolished, and one arrangement in another Member State may pose a few problems.   7 




At its meeting of 1 December 1997, the Council laid down, alongside the Code of 
Conduct for business taxation, the broad principles that “might form a basis" for a 
Council  Directive  on  the  taxation  of  savings  income.  These  principles,  which  are 
outlined below, led, on 20 May 1998, to a Commission proposal for a Directive and 
intensive negotiations, which, for the most part, came to fruition in June 2003.
20 The 
mandate from the Council stated that “the scope of such a directive could be limited to 
interest paid in one Member State to individuals who are resident in another Member 
State.”  Though  identifying  an  individual' s  place  of  residence  proved  relatively 
unproblematic, compared with the other issues raised by the political agreement, the 
same cannot be said of the definition of “interest”. The problem is that a number of 
financial  products,  and  in  particular  those  proposed  by  collective  investment 
undertakings (CIUs), combine interest income, which is covered by the Directive, 
with income such as capital gains, which are not.  
 
The Council also suggested that “as a first step towards effective taxation of savings 
income  throughout  the  Community,  such  a  directive  could  be  based  on  the 
“coexistence  model”,  under  which  each  Member  State  would  either  operate  a 
withholding tax or provide information on savings income to other Member States”. 
This model was intended to take account of each Member State’s circumstances, and 
in particular Luxembourg and Austria’s rules on banking secrecy, which made the 
exchange of information harder to apply than a withholding tax. However, such a 
model also meant that two residents of a given Member State could, if interest was not 
spontaneously declared in their Member State of residence, find themselves paying 
different  amounts of income tax on a given financial investment according to the 
place  of  collection  of  the  interest.  The  coexistence  model  would  not  therefore  be 
conducive  to  the  optimal  allocation  of  capital  in  the  Community  territory
21. 
Furthermore,  countries  applying  withholding  tax  could  receive  both  information 
concerning their residents abroad and a share of the withholding tax paid by nationals 
of  other  Member  States  resident  in  their  territory.  This  would  give  them  a 
disproportionate share of the revenue generated by the taxation of savings income. 
Lastly,  some  preferred  the  exchange  of  information  to  withholding  tax  because  it 
enabled them to levy tax at the marginal rate for all taxpayers, with income from 
abroad being treated in the same way as domestic income when determining the rate 
of taxation. 
 
The  Council  also  stressed  “the  need  to  preserve  the  competitiveness  of  European 
financial markets on a global scale”, which made it “advisable for the points set out 
above  to  be  adopted  as  widely  as  possible.  To  this  end,  Member  States  should 
undertake to promote the establishment of equivalent measures in third countries [and 
in their dependent or associated territories], at the same time as discussions on the 
Directive are taking place”. Confining measures on savings to the Member States 
alone risked causing considerable capital flight from the Community.  
                                                 
20  See COM(1998)295. This proposal for a Directive followed up and replaced a proposal first 
tabled by the Commission in 1989, fixing a 15% withholding tax on income from interest 
payments [COM(1989)60]. 




Unlike  the  arrangements  made  for  the  Code  of  Conduct,  the  procedure  used  for 
savings taxation was, at least to begin with, the traditional “Community” approach: 
the Commission tabled a proposal for a Directive, which was then discussed by a 
Council working group; the results of these negotiations were regularly forwarded to 
Ecofin by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). 
 
However, owing to the highly political nature of savings taxation and the failure of 
the negotiations at the Helsinki European Council, it was agreed that a high-level 
working group would consider specifically how measures to tax savings might be 
implemented most effectively.
22 Quite separate from the Code of Conduct Group and 
the Taxation Policy Group, this working group depends directly on the Council.
23 The 
underlying idea was, as it were, to cut out the middlemen – the Council’s technical 
working  group  on  tax  issues  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  Coreper  –  to  address  this 




The Directive on the taxation of savings income was adopted only after a series of 
partial political agreements and major external negotiations. After a stalemate at the 
Helsinki European Council, the Santa Maria da Feira European Council of 19 and 
20 June 2000 established a number of basic principles for taxing savings with the 
adoption of a report from Ecofin.
24 Santa Maria da Feira enshrined the primacy of a 
strategy  based  on  the  exchange  of  information  on  cross-border  interest  payments, 
though a limited number of Member States would be allowed to apply a withholding 
tax for a transition period. These principles were fine-tuned at Ecofin’s meeting of 26 
and 27 November 2000 and led, on 18 July 2001, to a new proposal for a Directive 
from  the  Commission.
25  Political  agreement  was  reached  at  Ecofin’s  meeting  of 
21 January 2003, and the Directive was formally adopted on 3 June 2003 as part of an 
overall agreement on the Tax Package. However, the conclusions of the Santa Maria 
da Feira European Council made the Directive’s application conditional on sufficient 
assurances that equivalent measures would be adopted in six non-member countries 
(United States, Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino) and the 
same measures in ten dependent or associated territories of the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands  (Guernsey, Jersey,  Isle of Man, British Virgin  Islands,  Turks and 
Caicos  Islands,  Netherlands  Antilles,  Anguilla,  Cayman  Islands,  Montserrat  and 
Aruba).  In  October  2001  Ecofin  mandated  the  Commission  to  open  negotiations. 
These went on to the end of 2004.  
 
                                                 
22  See Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki European Council of 11 December 1999. 
23  Note, however, that some members of this Group are also members of other groups described 
above. 
24  See Annex IV to the Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European Council of 
19 and 20 June 2000. 
25  See COM(2001)400 of 18 July 2001. On 13 December 2001 the Council approved a revised 
proposal for a Directive. On 5 March 2002 a standard format was adopted for the exchange of 
information.   9 
In line with the conclusions of the Ecofin meetings of 26 and 27 November 2000, 
21 January 2003 and 3 June 2003, the main thrust of the Directive is as follows: 
 
-  Its ultimate objective is the exchange of information. All Member States will one 
day automatically forward information on interest payments to residents of other 
Member States. All bar Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria introduce a system for 
automatically transferring information on the Directive’s application. The three 
exceptions  will  introduce  such  a  system  after  a  transition  period.  During  that 
period they levy withholding tax at a rate of 15% for the first three years, 20% for 
the next three years and 35% thereafter. They transfer 75% of the revenue from 
that withholding tax to the investor’s Member State of residence. 
 
-  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  Austria  will  implement  the  automatic  exchange  of 
information (i) if and when the European Community reaches an agreement (by 
unanimous decision of the Council) with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, 
Monaco and Andorra to exchange information concerning interest payments on 
request under the OECD’s 2002 agreement on exchange of information on tax 
matters; (ii) if and when the Council agrees unanimously that the United States is 
committed  to  exchanging  information  on  request  under  the  same  OECD 
agreement. The Directive also allows these countries to proceed to the automatic 
exchange of information before these conditions are met. 
 
-  The scope of the Directive is defined and includes interest payments on all sorts of 
debt  claims,  especially  income  from  domestic  or  international  bonds.  The 
inclusion, at least in principle (see the next indent), of income from international 
bonds, including Eurobonds, marks a great step forward in that the UK opposed it 
for a long time.  In addition to income distributed by CIUs, the Directive also 
applies to similar income going through structures used as substitutes for CIUs, 
and to income realised on the sale or redemption of parts or shares in coordinated 
CIUs with more than 40 % of their assets in debt claims. This threshold will, 
however, fall to 25% on 1 January 2011. 
 
-  “A grandfather clause will be provided until the end of the transitional period: 
income from negotiable loan securities tied to issues for which the prospectuses 
have been certified by the competent authority before [1 March 2001]
26 or, in the 
absence  of  any  prospectus,  to  issues  made  before  the  same  date,  will  not  be 
covered by the Directive during that period.”
27 This clause is explained by the fact 
that contracts for the issue of negotiable loan securities can include a gross-up 
clause in which the issuer undertakes to provide investors with interest net of tax 
by bearing the cost of any change in tax law. However, the gross-up clause is 
usually accompanied by a redemption clause to protect the debtor from substantial 
changes in tax law. Without a grandfather clause, the financial markets could have 
been disturbed by a surge in the redemption of claims over a very short period as 
issuers took advantage of a fall in interest rates to repay loans contracted at higher 
rates. 
 
                                                 
26  The initial date of 1 January 2001 was replaced by 1 March 2001 at the Ecofin meeting of 26 
and 27 November 2000. 
27  See the press release for the Ecofin meeting of 26 and 27 November 2000.   10 
-  The  mechanisms  for  identifying  the  paying  agent  and  the  beneficial  owner  of 
interest payments covered by the Directive were also defined and accepted. The 
paying  agent  is  any  economic  operator  (generally  a  financial  institution) 
responsible for the payment of interest for the immediate benefit of the beneficial 
owner. Paying agents are therefore the final link in the chain of intermediaries. 
They are responsible for informing their tax administration of interest payments to 
individuals (beneficial owners) residing in other Member States or, in the case of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria, for levying the withholding tax during the 
transition period. The Directive also lays down basic procedures for establishing 
the identity and place of residence of beneficial owners. 
 
-  The  Directive  was  to  be  implemented  in  national  law  by  1 January 2004 
(1
 May 2004  for  the  ten  new  Member  States).  Its  provisions  apply  from 
1 July 2005
28.  Agreements  with  five  non-member  countries  (Switzerland, 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino) on equivalent measures, and 
with the relevant dependent or associated territories of Member States on the same 
measures as those of the Directive, apply from the same date. 
 
The external negotiations on the Directive on savings income accounted for a lot of 
the work carried out in the matter. One major result was the adoption of common 
rules in an area far greater than the EU. At its meeting of 16 October 2001, Ecofin 
launched  the  negotiations  with  the  non-member  countries  mentioned  in  the  Santa 
Maria da Feira conclusions by authorising the European Commission to open formal 
negotiations.  The  Commission  was  mandated  to  conduct  negotiations  in  close 
conjunction with the Council Presidency and in regular consultation with the High 
Level Group on the Tax Package. In follow-up to the negotiations, Ecofin accepted, 
on  21 January 2003,  that  practices  in  the  United  States  were  already  equivalent 
measures and that the Community should conclude agreements with the other above 
mentioned  five  countries  including  a  withholding  tax,  voluntary  disclosure  of 
information,  a  review  clause  and  a  provision  on  an  exchange  of  information  on 
request in cases of tax fraud and similar misbehaviour. At its meeting of 3 June 2003, 
the date of the adoption of the Directive on savings income, Ecofin approved the text 
of the agreement with Switzerland, including a provision requested by Switzerland 
which  extended  to  Swiss  firms  some  of  the  advantages  of  the  Parent/Subsidiary 
Directive  and  the  Directive  on  interest  and  royalty  payments.
29  A  year  later,  on 
2 June 2004,  Ecofin  noted  with  satisfaction  that  agreement  in  principle  had  been 
reached  on  all  matters  of  substance  with  the  relevant  dependent  and  associated 
territories of Member States and with Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino 
and Switzerland on the necessary arrangements to enable the Directive on savings 
income to be applied. Because Switzerland was unable to apply the Directive from 
1 January 2005,  the  Council  accepted,  at  its  meeting  of  19 July 2004,  the  date  of 
1 July 2005.
30 
                                                 
28  The original application date was 1 January 2005. In accordance with Article 17(3) of the 
Directive,  the  Council,  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  adopted  a  Decision  on 
19 July 2004 postponing the date of application to 1 July 2005. 
29  Spain was granted a temporary derogation for the application of this provision in its bilateral 
relations with Switzerland. 
30  The  agreement  with  Switzerland  was  signed  on  26 October 2004.  The  agreement  with 
Andorra was signed on 15 November 2004. The agreements with the other three non-member 
countries were signed on 7 December 2004.   11 




At its meeting on 1 December 1997, Ecofin decreed, as the third component of the 
Tax  Package,  that  “the  Commission  should  submit  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  on 




In  practice,  the  Directive  is  aimed  at  exempting  the  lion’s  share  of  cross-border 
interest and royalty payments between associated companies from taxation at source. 
There  are  a  number  of  good  reasons  for  doing  so.  First,  in  a  single  market, 
transactions between companies of different Member States should not be subject to 
less favourable tax conditions than those applicable to the same transactions carried 
out between companies of the same Member State. This requirement was not fulfilled 
by a number of tax rules which existed before the Directive on interest and royalty 
payments was adopted. Second, national tax laws coupled, where applicable, with 
bilateral agreements did not ensure that double taxation was completely eliminated. 
Third, the application of the existing rules often entailed burdensome administrative 
formalities and cash-flow problems for the companies concerned. 
 
A  number  of  technical  issues  were  discussed.  With  regard  to  the  scope  of  the 
Directive, the main issue was whether the Directive would cover just the forms of 
company listed in the annex to the Merger and Parent/Subsidiary Directives or all 
companies subject to corporation tax. Another topic was the nature of the requisite 
relationship between associated companies: at issue was whether only direct holdings 
were to be taken into account or whether indirect holdings would also count. Greece, 
Portugal  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Spain  stressed  the  financial  impact  the  Directive 
would  have  on  their  tax  take.  As  net  importers  of  technology  and  capital,  these 
countries  benefit  more  than  others  from  the  taxation  of  cross-border  interest  and 
royalty payments. They therefore insisted on special treatment for a transition period. 
There was also discussion of whether royalties should include payments received in 
remuneration for the use or enjoyment of software and for leasing. Lastly, a number 
of  Member  States  did  not  want  the  Directive  to  apply  when  interest  and  royalty 
payments  are  subject,  by  way  of  derogation,  to  preferential  treatment  in  the 




The third component of the Tax Package, the proposal for a Directive on the taxation 
of interest and royalty payments is sometimes seen as the least important of the three 
in political and budgetary terms. For this reason it, unlike the other two components 
of the Tax Package, was the subject of very little negotiation in high-level groups. 
 
                                                 
31  See Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 
and  royalty  payments  made  between  associated  companies  of  different  Member  States 
(COM(1998) 67 final). This proposal follows up a proposal for a Council Directive presented 
by  the  Commission  on  28 November 1990  but  subsequently  withdrawn  [COM(1993)  196 
final].   12 
Most of the debate took place in a Council tax working group. The results were then 
approved by Ecofin, maintaining a very clear link between this dossier and the other 
two. Thus, though political agreement was reached on the main issues at the Ecofin 
meeting of 25 May 1999, it was stated that “this Directive is part of the Tax Package 
adopted under the Luxembourg Presidency on 1 December 1997. Only in that context 




Those issues relating to the Directive on interest and royalty  payments still to be 
resolved in 1999 were settled at the Ecofin meeting of 26 and 27 November 2000. The 
Council  formally  adopted  the  Directive  on  3 June 2003  as  part  of  the  overall 
agreement on the Tax Package.
32 
 
Under that agreement, the list of company forms was that featuring in the Merger and 
Parent/Subsidiary  Directives  at  that  time
33.  Greece  and  Portugal  were  granted  an 
eight-year transition period, during which they were authorised to apply a withholding 
tax of up to 10% for the first four years and up to 5% for the subsequent four years. 
Spain too was granted, though only for royalty payments, a transition period of six 
years  from  the  beginning  of  the  plan  for  boosting  the  country’s  technological 
potential. During the transition period Spain is authorised to apply a withholding tax 
of not more than 10%. Note that the definition of royalties includes software and 
leasing. 
 
Since June 2003 other developments have taken place. Two new Directives have been 
adopted in connection with the accession to the EU of ten new Member States. Since 
the June 2003 Directive was adopted after the candidate countries signed the Act of 
Accession but before the Act’s entry into force, the Directive had to be amended to 
apply to the new Member States from the day of accession. A Directive
34 was adopted 
to  that  end  on  26 April 2004.  Moreover,  given  the  very  tight  deadline  for 
implementing the new Directive before accession, it was to be expected that some 
candidate  countries would experience difficulties. A new Directive was needed to 




As indicated above, the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in the Savings 
Directive provides, inter alia, for the elimination of withholding taxes on interest and 
royalty payments between a company in Switzerland and an affiliated company in an 
EU Member State. The Agreement began to apply on 1 July 2005. 
 
                                                 
32  Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States 
(OJ No L 157, 26.6.2003). 
In the meanwhile, the list annexed to the Merger and Parent/Subsidiary Directives has been 
extended to include, inter alia, the European Company and the European Cooperative Society. 
34  Council Directive 2004/66/EC of 26 April 2004 (OJ No L 168, 1.5.2004). 
35  Transition periods were granted to the Czech Republic (six years) and Slovakia (two years) 
for royalties. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were granted six-year transition periods for interest 
and  royalty  payments.  See  Council  Directive  2004/76/EC  of  29  April  2004  amending 
Directive 2003/49/EC (OJ No L 168, 1.5.2004).   13 
2.   Current issues and policy options 
 
The  previous  section  presents  the  process  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  Tax 
Package. It recalls the main elements of each of its three elements components, i.e. the 
specific outcome of the long negotiation of the package. 
 
This section focuses on the recent developments in these three policy areas. It offers 
an overview of some of the main policy issues under discussion. The three elements 
of the Package are examined in turn. 
 
2.1.  The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
Recent developments 
 
An important element underlying many discussions regarding the Code of Conduct 
relates to the impact of the Code on Member States'  (and other countries' ) tax systems.  
 
Most  Member  States  have  lowered  the  general  corporate  tax  rates  in  an  effort  to 
enhance their attractiveness for the location of business activities (either domestic or 
foreign) or profits. It is sometimes argued that the elimination of harmful tax regimes 
as a result of the Code of Conduct work has been one significant factor in explaining 
this  trend.  This  has  led  to  extreme  examples  of  some  dependent  and  associated 
territories where the rollback of harmful tax measures has been accompanied by the 
introduction of a 0% rate or the complete abolition of corporate income tax.  
 
Furthermore, tax publications seem to argue that EU Member States are more and 
more confronted with the transfer of mobile assets of companies to group companies 
outside the EU. One of the main motivations for the transfer of these assets seems to 
be found in the advantageous tax treatment of income on these assets in several non-
EU jurisdictions, leading to a low effective level of taxation. It is recognised that these 
activities are highly mobile and, in absence of equivalent low effective tax rates in the 
EU, one might argue that the Code process has driven these assets and activities away 
from the EU. On the basis of the outline of the Code of Conduct and the intentions at 
the start of the process many Member States were looking, in first instance, to unfair 
tax competition which was being conducted within the EU borders, and in some cases 
their associated and dependent territories. There was also the intention to broaden the 
fight against harmful tax competition to countries outside the EU, which was partly 
achieved by the OECD process against harmful tax practices.  
 
Apart  from  these  efforts,  another  result  of  the  Code  process  could  have  been  the 
practice of copying the lowest benchmark. The Code of Conduct Group has approved 
regimes, after amending proposals, which still include features that are advantageous 
or open opportunities for tax planning schemes. The fact that the Group has allowed 
such features to continue in some tax regimes has led to the creation of "benchmarks". 
In practice it means that Member States having to make changes to their existing 
measures  because  these  are  declared  harmful,  or  Member  States  designing  a  new 
measure, can design a tax regime based on the "lowest" level accepted by the Code 
Group  for  the  different  features  of  the  measure.  Examples  of  such  practices  may 
include  liquidation  loss  provision  regimes,  holding  company  regimes,  shipping 
regimes and collective investment funds regimes.   14 
Policy issues 
 
On the basis of developments to tax systems within EU Member States one could 
consider the need for widening the scope of the measures covered by the work of the 
Code.  For  example,  already  during  the  discussions  concerning  the  drafting  of  the 
Code of Conduct, some Member States pleaded for a wider scope than finally agreed. 
This is also reflected in the preamble of the Code where the Council recalled that 
certain Member States, and the Commission, considered that special tax arrangements 
for  employees  ("expatriate  regimes")  could  come  within  the  range  of  the  issues 
covered by the Code.  
 
A similar point of discussion concerning the coverage of the Code can be found in 
preferential regimes, which include features at the (corporate) shareholder level, by 
refunding corporation taxes of the distributing company. It has been argued by some 
that these regimes are not covered by the Code. So far, the majority of Member States 
nevertheless considered that these measures are covered by the Code. However, it 
cannot be excluded that there will be further attempts to design tax measures that are 
harmful within the spirit of the Code while being arguably outside the literal scope of 
the Code. This could significantly weaken the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct. 
 
Apart from these measures there may be others which, either because they were not 
covered by the scope of the Code or because they were not identified as problematic 
at the time, were not subject to an evaluation by the Group but in fact may constitute 
harmful tax measures.  One such area is the use of different forms of hybrid entities or 
hybrid  capital
36  and  the  effect  that  can  be  achieved  by  taking  advantage  of  the 
differences in treatment that exists in different tax systems. The use of qualification 
differences between Member States is widespread in current tax practice. It could be 
useful to describe the practices used to review the rulings given by tax authorities in 
this field and to discuss with Member States possible strategies to combat these forms 
of tax avoidance.  
Overall, these issues highlight that some review of the Code of Conduct could be 
useful in the future, in order to ensure that the criteria used in the Code are adequate 
in determining whether a measure is harmful or not.  
 
However,  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  a  revision  of  the  Code  would  not  solve  an 
important problem, namely the lack of a level playing field between those countries 
and  territories  which  have  implemented  the  Code  and  those  that  have  not.  The 
Member  States  and  their  associate  and  dependent  territories  have  undertaken  an 
important  work  to  eliminate  their  harmful  tax  regimes.  This  has  led,  to  a  certain 
extent, to the relocation of related activities or profits to countries which have not 
undertaken  comparable  efforts  to  eliminate  their  harmful  regimes.  Therefore,  as  a 
complement to the above, a reflection on the ways to maintain a level playing field 
would also seem necessary. 
 
Two options can in particular be envisaged in order to achieve a level playing field. 
The first option consists in promoting the adoption of the principles of the Code of 
                                                 
36   Hybrid  entities,  i.e.  entities  which  are  considered  as  a  corporate  body  (opaque)  by  one 
Member State and as non-corporate (transparent) by another Member State. hybrid capital, i.e. 
the difference of qualification by Member States of debt / equity.    15 
Conduct on as broad a geographical basis as possible, as foreseen in paragraph M of 
the Code. In practice, explicit reference to the Code of Conduct has been included in 
action plans related to countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
It is envisaged that due reference to the Code is inserted in future relevant economic 
partnership  agreements.  Moreover,  the  Commission  indicated  that  it  is  willing  to 
support  international  (OECD)  and  EU  tax  standards  in  the  10
th  European 
Development Fund. In this respect, the OECD Global Forum made significant efforts 
in identifying a possible level playing field in the area of transparency and exchange 
of information for tax purposes, and conducted a comprehensive review of over 80 tax 
systems
37. This work may contribute to removing harmful tax competition from third 
countries. 
 
A second option could also be envisaged, where Member States would be allowed to 
offer  specific  tax  advantages  for  certain  types  of  income.  This  solution  could  be 
focussed on specific types of income and should avoid the erosion of EU tax bases. 
The most important goal for the EU would be to prevent these highly mobile assets 
leaving  the  EU.  In  the  discussions  prior  to  the  November  1999  report  it  was 
mentioned that fierce global competition could be used as an argument to give special 
treatment for certain types of activities. Along these lines one could argue that the EU 
could allow a specific type of income to be taxed at a separate rate (a lower rate than 
the general applicable EU average rate, for example 10%). 
 




On 1 July 2005, the provisions of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments (the "Savings Directive") started to 
be applied by all the (then) 25 Member States on the basis of most of the principles 
agreed in 1997 (see section 1.2), apart from the one related to the permanent character 
of the coexistence model. The same measures in the Directive are also applied since 
the  1st  of  July  2005  in  10  dependent  or  associated  territories  through  the 
implementation of bilateral agreements signed by each of the Member States with 
these jurisdictions; and equivalent measures are applied in 5 European third countries, 
including Switzerland, and the USA. On 1 January 2007, the number of participating 
jurisdictions was raised to 42 following the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania to the 
EU. 
 
A  summary  of  available  figures  (as  at  8  September  2006)  on  the  amounts  of 
withholding tax levied between 1 July and 31 December 2005 under the Directive on 
taxation of savings (Council Directive 2003/48/EC) and the related agreements
38 is 
provided below. 
                                                 
37   See OECD (2006), "Tax co-operation: towards a level-playing field", Paris. 
38   It is important to note that, following the Conclusions adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 12 
April 2005, only interest income accrued after 1 July 2005 is subject to withholding tax at the 
moment of payment. It is also important to note that some of the UK territories which agreed 
to apply the savings taxation measures in the form of a withholding tax (namely Isle of Man 
and Turks and Caicos Islands) have a fiscal year which does not end on 31 December: the 
revenue of the withholding tax levied by these territories from 1 July 2005 is therefore known 
and  partially  transferred  to  the  EU  Member  States  at  a  later  moment  than  for  the  other 
withholding tax countries and territories.   16 
 
Country applying 
the savings taxation 
measures in the form 
of a withholding tax 
Total amount 






in millions ￿  
Detail of 
distribution by 
MS of 75% of 
this amount 
Comment 




Belgium  ￿10  ￿10  Available only 
for LU 
Oral questions 11221 and 
12282 / 2006 (BE 
parliament) 
Luxembourg  ￿48  ￿48  Not available  Interview released on 17 
May 2006 to "Luxemburger 
Wort" by Budget minister 
Frieden 
Jersey  £13 
 
￿18,74  Not public  Press release on 12 June 
Guernsey  £4,5 
 
￿6,49  Not available  Press release on 15 June  
Isle of Man  N/A      Tax year ends on 5 April  
 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
N/A      Tax year ends on 30 
September 
Liechtenstein  CHF 4 
 
￿2,55  Not available  Press release on 6  April  
Switzerland  CHF 159,4 
 
￿101,68  Yes, in the 
press release 
The Press release on 29 
June provides also details on 
the exchange of information 
under the voluntary 
disclosure procedure 
 
These figures allow for a preliminary analysis of savings income earned in the form of 
interest by EU non residents in these jurisdictions. To take one example, with some 
￿2,5 million (CHF 4 million) savings tax collected in Liechtenstein in the second half 
of 2005 at 15% tax rate, the total interest subject to the "tax retention" provided for by 
the agreement with the EU was approximately ￿16,9 million. Based on an estimated 
average interest rate of 3%, and considering the fact that only interest income accrued 
and paid in the second semester 2005 can be subject to the tax, the total savings 
capital concerned for 6 months would have been ￿1,2 billion. Similar estimates can be 




The  Directive  provides  in  Article  18  for  a  review  after  three  years  of  experience 
gained in applying the Directive, on the basis of a Commission report. If appropriate, 
amendments  to  the  Directive  will  be  proposed  to  the  Council  to  ensure  effective 
taxation  of  savings  income  and  to  remove  undesirable  distortion  of  competition. 
Several elements of the savings directive, which could be considered for review, are 
examined below: 
 
-  Transposition  and  interpretation  of  the  Directive  as  it  stands  and  questions  of 
conformity with its aim 
   17 
The  detailed  transposition  of  the  Directive  into  the  27  national  legislative  and 
administrative systems is quite recent and the first exchanges of information and 
transfers of withholding tax revenues, concerning interest payments made in the 
second semester of 2005, occurred around mid-2006. It is therefore premature to 
make an in-depth assessment of the quality and the actual effectiveness of the 
Directive at this stage. Such an assessment will only be possible after significant 
experience of its implementation.  
 
However, some preliminary issues related to the transposition or interpretation of 
the Directive can already be raised. A first possible problem may be the treatment 
of non-UCITS
39 investment funds and funds of funds, the treatment of vehicles 
like trusts and the treatment of certain derivative products that, rather than being 
really innovative financial products, could be concretely used as an alternative to 
investment  in  debt-claims.  There  could  be  a  need  for  comparing  the  different 
approaches regarding the treatment of all these financial instruments in order to 
ensure  that  the  application  of  the  relevant  sections  of  the  current  text  of  the 
Directive  reflect  correctly  the  true  intentions  of  the  Council  and  to  avoid 
undesirable distortions within financial markets.  
 
-  Geographical scope of the savings tax measures 
 
At the ECOFIN Council of 21 January 2003, the Council asked the Commission 
to continue discussing possible improvements to information exchange with the 
US, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino, as well as to 
start,  after  1  July  2005,  new  discussions  with  additional  important  financial 
centres  with  a  view  to  promoting  the  adoption  of  measures  equivalent  to  the 
Directive also in those locations.  
 
On 23 October 2006, the Council invited the  Commission to start exploratory 
talks to this purpose with Hong Kong, Singapore and Macao, in order to achieve a 
level playing field in the financial service sector with these jurisdictions. 
 
-  Content of the Directive 
 
Beyond an assessment focusing on the geographical scope, the transposition or the 
interpretation of the directive, it is useful to examine possible ways to render the 
Directive more effective without hindering companies'  activities. This could lead 
to proposals for more substantial modifications to the Directive.  
 
As  highlighted  by  the  preamble  to  the  Directive,  its  aim  is  to  enable  savings 
income in the form of interest payments, made in one Member State to beneficial 
owners who are individuals resident in another Member State, to be made subject 
to effective taxation in the country of residence of such individuals. Therefore, 
only interest payments to individuals, or interest income obtained by individuals 
through the intermediation of certain types of investment funds, fall within the 
scope  of  the  Directive.  All  payments  to  legal  persons  are,  for  the  time  being, 
excluded. Other forms of income from financial investments, like dividends and 
payments  from  pension  funds  or  unit-linked  life  insurances,  are  also  excluded 
                                                 
39   UCITS= Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities.   18 
from its application. This is also the case with proceeds from innovative financial 
products,  which  have  been  excluded  from  the  present  scope  of  the  Savings 
Directive, but left subject to the review of the Directive provided for under Article 
18, by the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 25 May 1999.  
 
In the future, certain types of savings income, which had initially been excluded 
from the scope of the Directive, could be added to that scope. This could, for 
instance,  be  the  case  with  income  from  unit-linked  life  insurances  or  pension 
schemes, and possibly also with dividends paid to individuals. The inclusion of 
such elements of income within the scope could possibly also benefit individuals, 
if a complete elimination of double taxation on that income could be obtained 
through the application of the Directive. One could also examine how to extend 
the scope of the Directive to include payments of capital income made to those 
legal entities acting as intermediaries between the source of savings income and 
the individuals, when this intermediation prevents the effective application of the 
Directive to the ultimate beneficiary. This problem does not only arise with legal 
entities established in Member States but also with those established in off-shore 
centres. 
 
It is sometimes argued that a different approach to the one underlying the Savings 
Directive should be envisaged in the future. The Directive is based on the notion that, 
within an internal market where capital can move freely, the state of residence of the 
individual  investor  should  be  able  to  tax  the  cross-border  savings  income  of  its 
resident taxpayers in accordance with its own national tax laws, thus not requiring 
Member States to harmonise their tax treatment on such income. This approach is 
consistent with current international tax principles which attribute the taxing rights on 
passive income primarily or exclusively to the state of residence of the investor, and 
which -at most- grant a limited taxing right to the state of source (see e.g. Articles 10-
12  of  the  OECD  Model  Tax  Convention).  This  approach  is  premised  on  the 
assumption that the state of residence has sufficient knowledge of such cross-border 
payments.  In  practice,  this  requires  a  considerable  degree  of  administrative  co-
operation and exchange of information which some countries may currently not be 
willing or able to provide due to national provisions or practices which limit access to 
bank information for tax purposes
40. The current policy objective, both within the EU 
and the OECD, is to try and remove such obstacles and to promote effective exchange 
of information. An alternative would be to move away from residence based taxation 
towards  source  based  taxation  by  ensuring  that  savings  income  is  subject  to  an 
equivalent  level  of  taxation  in  the  countries  where  such  income  arises.  Such  an 
approach  would  most  likely  involve  the  introduction  of  harmonised  source-type 
withholding taxes on different types of savings income, possibly combined with anti-
abuse measures to deal with those countries or territories which are not willing to levy 
such taxes. Under this approach, passive foreign source income would no longer be 
subject to progressive income taxation in the state of residence of the investor and 
there would thus be less need for exchange of information on such payments.  
 
                                                 
40   See the OECD report Improving access to bank information for tax purposes (2000), and the 
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In  September  2005,  the  Commission  requested  the  International  Bureau  of  Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) to carry out a survey of the implementation of the Directive 
(including the amending Directives) and the (EC-Swiss Savings) Agreement
41. This 
report highlighted that, while the implementation has generally taken place in a timely 
manner, there appears to be some risk that certain key concepts of the Directive will 
be interpreted differently in different Member States. In some cases this could lead to 
relief being denied in one Member State whereas it would be available, in otherwise 
identical circumstances, in another Member State. Therefore, further discussions and 
clarification of concepts such as interest, royalties, beneficial ownership, etc. may be 




On 30 December 2003 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive 
amending the Directive of June 2003 on interest and royalty payments. There were 
two strands to the proposal.  
 
First, the Commission proposed amending Article 1 of the Directive so that Member 
States have to grant the benefits of the Directive only where the interest or royalty 
payment  concerned  is  not  exempt  from  corporate  taxation.  It  followed  up  the 
statement in the conclusions of the Ecofin meeting of 3 June 2003 that “the Council 
and  the  Commission  agree  that  the  benefits  of  the  Interest  and  Royalty  Directive 
should not accrue to companies that are exempt from tax on income covered by that 
Directive. The Council invites the Commission to propose any necessary amendments 
to this Directive in due time.”  
 
It also proposed amending the list of entities covered by the Directive to include other 
forms of company, and in particular the European company. In short, the aim was to 
bring  this  Directive’s  list  of  eligible  companies  into  line  with  that  of  the 
Parent/Subsidiary Directive" (as amended on 22 December 2003). The discussions on 
the  proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  amending  Directive  2003/49  are  still  under 
way
42. In absence of agreement, there is some doubt as to whether Member States can 
deny the benefits of the Directive to companies that are subject to no, or only a very 
low, tax on interest and royalty payments. Besides, the European Company and the 
European Cooperative Society are not explicitly covered by the Directive. Lastly, the 
Directive applies to fewer types of companies than the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
 
Besides,  the  above-mentioned  IBFD  survey  suggests  that  some  work  could  be 
necessary  in  order  to  clarify  concepts  used  in  the  Directive  and  coordinate  the 
Member States'  positions in this respect.  
                                                 
41   IBFD (2005, "Survey on the Implementation of the EC Interest and Royalty Directive".  
Available on http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/publications/studies/index_en.htm 
42   Article 8 of the Directive (2003/49) foresees that, by 31 December 2006, the Commission 
shall report to the Council on the operation of the Directive, "in particular with a view to 
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3.   A flashback to the Verona Strategy 
 
This  section  examines  a  number  of  particularly  interesting  aspects  of  the  Verona 
Strategy  and  draws  more  general  conclusions  about  the  EU’s  decision-making 
processes in tax matters. 
 
3.1.  A comprehensive approach 
 
In a decision-making process based on unanimity, as is the case with tax matters at 
EU level, a Member State has to get something out of the negotiations. Otherwise it 
has every incentive to veto the proposals made. In other words, it is not enough for a 
proposal  to  benefit  the  EU  as  a  whole;  it  has  to  benefit  each  Member  State 
individually. This has major implications for EU tax policy: any proposal that fails to 
satisfy this condition is doomed to failure, no matter how great the potential benefits 
of its implementation to the EU as a whole.  
 
The  “comprehensive”  approach  developed  at  Verona  and  the  creation  of  a  Tax 
Package were particularly useful in that they acknowledged this fundamental problem 
in European tax policy and addressed it by bundling a number of tax issues which, 
though not benefiting each and every Member State on their own, did benefit the EU 
as a whole. In this way, each Member State drew a net advantage from the body of 
components making up the Tax Package. 
 
Though there is nothing new about linking a number of issues (especially not at EU 
level), explicitly linking, from the very outset, a number of issues which were not 
necessarily clearly related was, however, a highly innovative step in the tax sphere. It 
is interesting to note that the Directive on interest and royalty payments, on which 
agreement  had  been  reached  in  2000,  remained  on  hold  until  the  other  two 
components of the Tax Package were wrapped up. 
 
The  success  of  the  Tax  Package  contrasted  with  the  failure  to  adopt  any  other 
directive on direct taxation since 1990. This might be taken as meaning that the only 
way to achieve further substantial progress on tax matters at EU level is by means of a 
comprehensive approach or the creation of tax packages. 
 
This is, however, far from certain, since a comprehensive approach poses a variety of 
problems.  Side-by-side  negotiations  on  a  number  of  issues  demand  that  both  the 
Member States and the Commission dispose of appropriate political will – and the 
necessary human resources. The issues must also be chosen carefully: there must be 
the prospect of substantial benefits. In the light of past experience, it is not certain that 
all Member States would back the creation of a new tax package. 
 
3.2.  A flexible negotiating structure 
 
Though bundling issues may, in theory, facilitate negotiations and achieve a better 
outcome for all parties, it is, in practice, difficult to assess each party' s gains and 
losses across a complex range of issues. It is therefore vital to develop a flexible, 
appropriate negotiating process that will keep score of such gains and losses. 
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From that perspective, it can be helpful to set up high-level working parties with 
variable mandates and working methods, drawn from experts in close contact with the 
Member State' s governments, as the progress made by these working parties during 
the Tax Package bears out. 
 
Similarly, the partial agreements reached at Ecofin meetings and European Councils 
also bring gradual progress towards an improved situation for the EU as a whole. 
Whenever a Member State reaches a potential sticking point in one area, it can be 
offered  compensation  in  that  or  another  area,  within  the  predefined  scope  of  the 
package. For instance, at Ecofin’s meeting on 26 and 27 November 2000, Belgium 
obtained  transition  arrangements  on  savings  (withholding  tax)  in  exchange  for 
progress on the Code of Conduct, a particularly sensitive matter in that country. 
 
This  flexibility  in  the  framework  and  timing  of  negotiations  offers  quite  a  few 
advantages.  But  it  also  has  serious  disadvantages  akin  to  those  associated  with  a 
comprehensive approach: cumbersome negotiations, lack of transparency, multiplicity 
of  negotiating  bodies,  coordination  difficulties  for  the  Council,  Commission  and 
Member States, and the absence of an overview at the level of the technical working 
parties, which leave Ecofin to sort out the political trade-offs between dossiers. These 
disadvantages  suggest  that  a  standing  high-level  working  group  (or  committee) 
specialising in tax issues might render the same services as the various high-level 
working groups and facilitate the preparation of Council negotiations on tax while 
operating  in  a  clearer,  more  effective  legal  framework  than  currently  exists.  The 
Taxation Policy Group’s role in preparing negotiations should not be underestimated 
either. 
 
3.3.  An open geographical framework 
 
In an economic environment characterised by great mobility of goods, services and 
capital, it is not always optimal to confine the debate to the EU alone. In particular, 
harmful tax competition often has repercussions far beyond the boundaries of the EU, 
as  the  current  OECD  discussions  on  the  issue  attest.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
consider the geographical scope of mooted tax measures. 
 
In  the  case  of  the  Tax  Package,  some  Member  States  stressed  the  need  to  keep 
advances inside and outside the EU (non-member countries, dependent and associated 
territories) in phase from the very outset of the negotiations.
43 An overall agreement 
on the Tax Package that did not respect this need for symmetry would undoubtedly 
have meant a loss for these Member States, even if it benefited the EU as a whole. 
 
An interesting issue that emerged at the very outset of negotiations was how – on 
what  terms  –  non-member  countries  or  dependent  and  associated  territories  of 
Member States could be induced to adopt rules they would not have embraced of their 
own volition. To that extent the problem was the same as that of the Member States, 
save that the countries and territories concerned might feel they had everything to 
gain from not going along with the EU initiative: in a world where tax bases are 
increasingly mobile, free-riders stand to gain more and more from an uncooperative 
                                                 
43  See,  in  particular,  the  Code  of  Conduct  and  the  conclusions  of  the  Santa  Maria  da  Feira 
European Council.   22 
policy at international level. Moreover, the non-member countries and dependent and 
associated territories concerned by the Tax Package are also in competition with other 
territories, and their participation in tax cooperation with the EU  could give their 
competitors an undue edge. 
 
The timing and strategy of the negotiations on the savings tax agreements with the 
five European non-EU countries were largely influenced by a specific element of the 
Council  conclusions  adopted  in  Feira  on  20  June  2000.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
adopted report of the ECOFIN Council to the European Council made the entry into 
application into the Community of the Savings Tax Directive almost conditional on 
obtaining  a  parallel  application  on  interest  paid  to  EU  residents  of  the  same  or 
equivalent measures by the five European non-EU countries. It is sometimes argued 
that  such  condition  made  the  negotiating  position  of  the  Community  particularly 
difficult, as the non-EU countries  concerned had been provided with the de facto 
power of vetoing the application inside the Community of an internal long-awaited 
legislative  instrument.  This  probably  gave  some  leverage  in  the  negotiation  to 
countries such as Switzerland
44.   
 
Nevertheless, the negotiations were able to proceed pragmatically thanks to a degree 
of  flexibility  in  the  demands  made  on  non-member  countries  and  dependent  or 
associated territories, e.g. application of a withholding tax rather than the automatic 
exchange of information. Furthermore, a number of incentives were offered in other 
matters.  Switzerland,  for  instance,  now  enjoys  the  benefits  afforded  by  the 
Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the Directive on interest and royalty payments. It is 
also possible that the negotiations on savings affected other discussions between the 
EU, or its Member States, and the countries and territories in question.  
 
Looking back at the approach used with the key third countries, one would perhaps 
advocate that the Community should avoid to making an internal agreement explicitly 
conditional to the agreement of a third party. In this respect, it should be noted that no 
such similar obligation has been claimed by the Council or by the 5 European non-EU 
countries for the future discussions to be held with other financial centres on taxation 
of savings.  
 
It is also significant that the EU’s negotiations with these countries and territories did 
not involve "defensive" measures. This could be explained by the inherent difficulty 
of taking a hard line when any decision has to be unanimous. Such measures could, 
however, be envisaged in the future, especially if they target market operators rather 
than states per se. The conditions laid down by the United States in respect of its 
"qualified intermediaries" could well inspire future international tax discussions. 
 
                                                 
44   See the views expressed on the Swiss federal official website on:  
http://www.europa.admin.ch/nbv/uebersicht/f/index.htm.   23 
Conclusions 
 
Recent history shows clearly that the EU’s Member States are not ready to give up 
their  sovereignty  in  tax  matters  and  accept  harmonisation  in  such  crucial  area  as 
income tax. It is also clear, however, that the process of European integration does 
make tax bases more mobile, effectively reducing the Member States’ autonomy in 
tax policy setting. This trend is amplified by the increasing impact of the case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Tax competition between Member 
States and their partners in the EU, dependent and associated territories and with third 
countries is causing loss of tax revenue and distorting the very structure of taxation. 
This can have serious consequences, for instance on employment. Ironically, a policy 
of cooperation at EU and international level now seems to be one of the only ways for 
governments to recover the room for manoeuvre they sometimes lack in tax matters. 
 
These considerations led the EU to develop an ambitious project in the sphere of 
direct taxation, the Tax Package. A lengthy debate culminated in an overall agreement 
in June 2003. This outcome was basically attributable to an innovative tax strategy, 
which involved bundling a number of sensitive issues so that every Member State 
could be an overall winner. The use of high-level working parties made it possible to 
keep political and technical advances in phase and to keep track of each Member 
State’s gains and losses. Lastly, the pressure brought by each Member State to bear on 
its partners made it increasingly difficult to rewind or halt the process as negotiations 
progressed.  On  the  down  side,  however,  the  strategy  demanded  considerable 
resources for the negotiations, which would make its application in less important tax 
matters in the future more problematic.  
 
The negotiations on the Tax Package highlighted the global dimension of tax issues. It 
could never have been concluded without the agreement of certain key third countries 
and dependent or associated territories of Member States. The tax debate thereby led 
to discussions on other aspects of the EU’s relations with the countries or territories 
concerned. Were action against harmful practices to be stepped up in the future, the 
EU’s Member States and institutions might consider explicitly linking the abolition of 
harmful tax practices to other issues, for instance trade or development aid, in order to 
encourage the adoption of international tax standards as widely as possible. Similarly, 
the  activities  of  various  international  organisations  with  regard  to  harmful  tax 
competition or related areas (e.g. money laundering or tax fraud) reinforce each other 
by putting the spotlight on the harmful practices of a few states at international level 
and by linking these different issues. 
 
Looking beyond the Tax Package, the EU will have to make a number of strategic 
choices in tax matters. The Community’s field of intervention in matters of harmful 
tax competition could be expanded to encompass additional forms of competition to 
those covered by the Tax Package. Special tax arrangements for expatriates are, for 
example, sometimes seen as a problem. Limits on statutory rates of business taxation 
could also figure on the agenda, provided a clear case is made to justify such a move. 
 
Decision-making processes and "institutions" are also an important issue. First, the 
headway  made  at  Nice  and  the  last  intergovernmental  conference  on  enhanced 
cooperation  hold  out  the  prospect  of  major  advances  in  areas  where  there  is  no 
unanimity  in  the  Council.  Second,  the  development  of  machinery  for  voluntary  
intergovernmental transfers facilitating the implementation of unanimous agreements 
could be useful – at least in theory — in certain specific cases. Lastly, the optimal 
structure for tax negotiations should be considered. The nub of the issue is whether to 
foster the existence of a loose negotiating structure based on a body of high-level 
working groups or to try and integrate these working groups into a more stable and 
coherent framework such as a Tax Policy Committee. 
 
The Tax Package has brought major advances in matters of tax policy at EU level. 
Besides  stimulating  thought  and  discussion  on  tax  competition,  it  has  raised 
awareness among the Member States of the interdependence of their tax policies and 
of the potential benefits of cooperation at EU level. 
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